Federal Court Releases ICE Detainee in 24 Hours: A § 1225(b)(1) Habeas Win

We are writing about this case because the legal theory matters far beyond our client. The District of New Jersey is rapidly developing a body of habeas case law that limits one of ICE's most aggressive detention tools — 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) — when it is applied to people who were originally paroled into the country. Three published decisions in three months — Fajardo-Nugra v. Soto, Suazo Rivera v. Blanche, and now our case — have all reached the same statutory conclusion. If your loved one entered the U.S. and was released on parole, was later detained by ICE under § 1225(b)(1), and is being held without a bond hearing, this opinion is directly on point.

The client's name is not disclosed in this article. The facts and legal posture are public record in the federal court filings; we use them here to show how the case was assembled, what the court relied on, and what the order requires the government to do.

The fact pattern

The client entered the United States in 2023. He was apprehended by federal authorities at or near the border and was released into the country on humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Humanitarian parole is a discretionary release mechanism that allows a noncitizen to be physically present in the U.S. on parole status while a decision on admission is pending. It is not an admission to the country, but it is a lawful presence with a defined legal posture.

For roughly two years he lived in the United States on that parole. He complied with the conditions of parole. He had no removal order. He had not been determined inadmissible after a full inadmissibility hearing.

In the spring of 2026, ICE took him into custody. The detention was logged not under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) — the statute that authorizes ordinary pre-removal detention with eligibility for a bond hearing before an immigration judge — but under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), the expedited-removal statute. Detention under § 1225(b)(1) is treated by the government as mandatory: no bond hearing, no Matter of Joseph hearing, no individualized assessment of flight risk or danger.

The case landed in our office. The client had no removal order, no recent border encounter, no fresh inadmissibility determination. He had been living on parole. The government's choice to detain him under § 1225(b)(1) — the statute reserved for individuals arriving at a port of entry or apprehended shortly after entry — did not match the facts.

The legal theory

The habeas petition was built on a single, narrow argument: 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) does not apply to a person who has already been paroled into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Once parole is granted, the person is no longer in the "arriving alien" posture that § 1225(b)(1) addresses. The government may have other detention authorities — § 1225(b)(2), § 1226(a), or perhaps § 1226(c) where the facts support it — but it cannot use § 1225(b)(1).

Two prior decisions out of the District of New Jersey supplied the framework:

• Fajardo-Nugra v. Soto, No. 26-975, 2026 WL 579192 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2026). Judge Brian R. Martinotti granted habeas relief and ordered release where the government had detained a petitioner under § 1225(b)(2) but the facts did not support that statute. The court refused to "convert" the detention to a potentially lawful form under a different statute with different procedural requirements. The case stands for the proposition that the government has to detain a person under the correct statute, and that a federal court will not paper over a misapplication by re-characterizing the detention after the fact.
• Suazo Rivera v. Blanche, No. 26-3892 (BRM) (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2026). Judge Martinotti applied the same statutory-fit principle to a § 1225(b)(1) detention of a paroled noncitizen and granted habeas relief. Suazo Rivera is the directly on-point precedent for our client's posture: parolee held under § 1225(b)(1), court finds the statute inapplicable, petition granted.

The constitutional dimension was secondary. The petition did rely on Fifth Amendment due process — prolonged detention without an individualized hearing raises substantive and procedural due-process concerns under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) — but the statutory argument was strong enough that the court did not need to reach the constitutional question. That is generally the right way to build a § 2241 habeas petition: statutory hook first, constitutional hook in reserve.

The petition

The petition was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Under Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), the proper respondent in an immigration habeas case is generally the immediate custodian — the warden of the facility — and the proper venue is the federal district where the petitioner is held. Both pieces were satisfied here.

The petition itself was tight. The factual recitation was paragraph-by-paragraph and cited the underlying immigration records. The statutory argument cited Suazo Rivera by docket number, applied its reasoning to our facts, and asked for the same relief: release, return of property, and an injunction against re-detention under § 1225(b)(1). The constitutional argument was preserved but did not carry the brief.

We did not request an evidentiary hearing. We did not ask for oral argument. The legal question was statutory and could be resolved on the petition's face combined with the documentary record. Asking only for what is necessary keeps the timeline short.

The order

The court entered its order on May 12, 2026 — less than 24 hours after filing. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti, the same judge who decided Fajardo-Nugra and Suazo Rivera. The court did exactly what those prior decisions said it would do.

The operative findings, in the court's own words:

• The petitioner cannot be mandatorily detained under § 1225(b)(1) because he was initially paroled into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
• His continued detention under § 1225(b)(1) is unlawful.
• While the government may have been able to detain him under a different statute, it chose § 1225(b)(1), and the court will not "convert" the detention to "a potentially lawful alternate form under a different statute with different procedural requirements and rules" (quoting Fajardo-Nugra).

The relief was comprehensive:

1. Release within 24 hours of the entry of the text order, on the same conditions that existed prior to the detention.
2. Return of all personal property seized at the time of detention — driver's license, passport, immigration documents, currency, cellphone.
3. A permanent injunction against detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), which the court has found inapplicable to the petitioner.
4. A 14-day stay on any arrest or detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), to "ensure full effectuation" of the order and prevent circumvention.
5. A three-day window for the government to file an expedited answer if it contends the case is factually distinguishable from Suazo Rivera, with petitioner's reply due three days after.

The 14-day stay is the part of the order that matters most as a practical matter. Without that protection, the government could in theory release a habeas petitioner one morning and re-detain him the same afternoon under a different statute. The stay forecloses that maneuver and gives the petitioner a meaningful runway to retain counsel, gather documents, and prepare for the next phase of immigration proceedings.

Why this opinion is replicable

The fact pattern is common. Hundreds of thousands of people have been paroled into the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) since 2023 — through CBP One, through humanitarian programs for nationals of specific countries, through case-by-case parole grants at ports of entry. The administration has been re-detaining many of those parolees in 2026. ICE has been logging the detentions inconsistently — some under § 1226(a), some under § 1225(b)(2), and some, like our client's case, under § 1225(b)(1).

When the detention is logged under § 1225(b)(1), the parolee is denied a bond hearing. That is what Suazo Rivera, Fajardo-Nugra, and our case all targeted. The same theory should win in the same district before any judge who follows the District of New Jersey's developing case law on statutory fit. It will probably also persuade judges in other districts who are willing to read § 1225(b)(1) the way the District of New Jersey is reading it.

If you or a family member is currently detained by ICE and the detention is documented under § 1225(b)(1) — meaning the person was originally paroled into the United States and is now being held without a bond hearing — this opinion is directly on point. The first step is to get the detention paperwork (Form I-200, Form I-286, or the more recent detention notice) and confirm the statute under which the detention is logged. The second step is to talk to counsel about whether a § 2241 habeas petition is appropriate for the facility and circuit involved.

What the order does not do

It is worth being precise about what the court did not rule. The court did not order an immigration judge to grant the petitioner relief from removal. It did not adjudicate any pending asylum, withholding, or cancellation claim. It did not foreclose the government from detaining the petitioner under a different statute after the 14-day stay expires. It did not announce a new rule of law for the country; it applied an existing District of New Jersey rule to a new petitioner.

What the order does is buy time and freedom. Time to live with family, prepare a defense, gather evidence for the underlying immigration case, and make decisions about next steps without the coercive pressure of detention. For a noncitizen with strong U.S. ties and a meritorious case, that time is often the difference between a successful outcome and a removal.

A note on the lawyers and the speed

This case did not move on paperwork alone. It moved because the firm's habeas team had read Fajardo-Nugra and Suazo Rivera when they came out, had templated the petition for this exact fact pattern, and had a working relationship with the federal court's electronic-filing rhythm in the District of New Jersey. When the client's family called, the legal posture was already mapped. The petition was drafted, signed, verified, and filed in less than a day. The court entered its order roughly 24 hours after filing because nothing in the case required additional briefing.

That is not how every habeas case will look. In a different district, on a different fact pattern, or before a judge unfamiliar with the parolee–§ 1225(b)(1) line of cases, the timeline is usually weeks or months. But the underlying point — that detention statute matters, that a federal court can and will look behind the government's chosen statute, and that habeas is the right tool when the government has misapplied the law — is portable.

If your family is in this posture

The basic intake screen is short:

1. Was the detainee originally paroled into the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)? Look at the I-94 record at i94.cbp.dhs.gov. Parole status will show with class of admission codes like PIP, OAR, CHNV, U4U, or similar.
2. What is the current detention statute? The detainer paperwork (Form I-200 administrative warrant, Form I-286 notice of custody determination) will state the statute. If you cannot get the paperwork, the immigration court system at acis.eoir.justice.gov can sometimes confirm the charge.
3. Has a bond hearing been held or scheduled? If the detention is logged under § 1225(b)(1) and the government has refused to schedule a bond hearing, the case is in the same posture as our client's.
4. Where is the detainee held? Habeas venue follows the immediate custodian. New Jersey detention triggers the District of New Jersey. Pennsylvania detention triggers the appropriate Pennsylvania district. New York detention triggers the Southern or Eastern District of New York. The federal district determines which case law controls.

If those four questions point in the direction of a habeas petition, contact counsel immediately. The detention will not get easier the longer it continues, and statutory misapplication does not cure itself over time.

Frequently asked questions

What is 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and why does the government use it for detention?

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) is the expedited-removal statute. It applies to noncitizens who are inadmissible and either (a) arriving at a port of entry, or (b) apprehended shortly after entry without admission. Detention under § 1225(b)(1) is mandatory — there is no bond hearing before an immigration judge and no individualized assessment of flight risk or danger. The government uses § 1225(b)(1) because it is fast and forecloses judicial bond review.

Why can't a parolee be detained under § 1225(b)(1)?

Once a noncitizen has been paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), the person is no longer in the "arriving alien" posture that § 1225(b)(1) was written for. The District of New Jersey has now held in three cases — Fajardo-Nugra v. Soto, Suazo Rivera v. Blanche, and our case — that detention of a paroled noncitizen under § 1225(b)(1) is unlawful. The government may have other detention statutes available, but § 1225(b)(1) is not one of them.

What is 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and when do I use it?

28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the federal habeas statute. It allows a person held in custody by the federal government to challenge the legality of that detention in federal court. In immigration practice, § 2241 is the right tool when (a) the detention statute is being misapplied, (b) the detention is unconstitutionally prolonged, or (c) the government has denied a hearing the law requires. The proper respondent is generally the immediate custodian (the warden of the facility), and the proper venue is the federal district where the detainee is held.

How fast can a habeas case move?

It depends on the district, the judge, the facts, and how much briefing the court wants. In our case, the order entered roughly 24 hours after filing because the legal theory had already been adopted by the same judge in two prior decisions. In a district where the law is undeveloped, expect weeks to months. In a district that is hostile to the theory, expect even longer or denial. Speed comes from legal posture, not from urgency alone.

What does the 14-day stay in the order actually do?

The 14-day stay forbids the government from arresting or detaining the petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for 14 days after release. Without that protection, the government could in theory release a habeas petitioner in the morning and re-detain him in the afternoon under a different statute, defeating the purpose of the order. The stay gives the petitioner time to retain counsel and prepare for the next phase of the immigration case.

Can the government appeal this kind of order?

Yes. The government can appeal the grant of a § 2241 habeas petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (for a District of New Jersey order) and can seek a stay of the release order pending appeal. In practice, where the order is grounded in clear statutory text and prior on-point decisions of the same court, stays pending appeal are difficult for the government to obtain.

Does this opinion help people outside New Jersey?

It is binding only in the District of New Jersey. But the statutory reasoning is portable. Any federal district court reading 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) closely should reach the same conclusion: the statute does not apply to someone who has been paroled into the United States. Counsel in other districts have used Fajardo-Nugra and Suazo Rivera as persuasive authority in similar petitions. The earlier the theory is presented to a particular judge, the more carefully it is briefed.

How does Modern Law Group handle these cases?

Our habeas team templates the petition for the recurring fact pattern, maintains active relationships with federal courts in the districts where our detained clients are held, and moves fast when the facts support it. We handle § 2241 habeas petitions in any federal district, bond hearings before immigration judges, motions to change venue, and the full range of detained-docket relief. If a family calls about a § 1225(b)(1) detention of a parolee, the case can be filed within 24 hours when the documentation is in order.